“Active measures” (Russian: aktivnye meropriyatiya) refers to the gamut of covert, often deceptive operations used by the Soviet Union and modern Russia to influence world events and public opinion. These activities go beyond classic espionage; as one former KGB officer explained, active measures were “not intelligence collection, but subversion” aimed to weaken the West, sow discord among allies, and undermine the United States’ reputation globally. From the Cold War to today, Moscow’s toolkit of active measures has evolved — encompassing forged documents, propaganda campaigns, disinformation, psychological operations, and even cyber attacks — but the strategic goal remains the same: to advance the Kremlin’s interests by covertly destabilizing opponents and shaping narratives in its favor. This report provides a comprehensive overview of the concept of active measures, its historical evolution, notable operations in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, the tactics and tools employed, and assessments by U.S. and U.K. sources of their effectiveness and current threat level.
Definition: In Soviet terminology, aktivnye meropriyatiya encompassed a broad array of clandestine political influence operations. A U.S. State Department report in the 1980s defined Soviet active measures as “a form of political warfare with deceptive and manipulative elements”sgp.fas.org. Rather than overt diplomacy or conventional military action, active measures relied on covert influence techniques to achieve foreign policy objectivessgp.fas.org. These techniques included disinformation (false or misleading information spread covertly), propaganda, forgery of documents, agents of influence, front organizations, and political provocations. The KGB’s Service A was the dedicated department for active measures (originally even called Service “D” for disinformation)marshallcenter.org, and KGB officers were expected to spend up to 25% of their time on active measures operationsdigitallibrary.tsu.ge. As historian Thomas Boghardt notes, Soviet active measures ranged from “manipulation and media control, written and oral disinformation, use of foreign communist parties and front organizations, clandestine radio broadcasting,” to more violent covert actions like “paramilitary operations, support of guerrilla groups and terrorist organizations,” and under Stalin even political assassinationsdigitallibrary.tsu.gedigitallibrary.tsu.ge. The overarching goal, in the KGB’s own words, was to “exert influence on the adversary and weaken his political, economic, scientific and technical and military positions”marshallcenter.org – in effect, to “weaken the USSR’s opponents (above all the ‘main enemy,’ the United States) and create a favorable environment for Moscow’s objectives”digitallibrary.tsu.ge.
Evolution: The use of active measures has deep roots in Russian strategic culture. Even during the Soviet era, leaders saw themselves in a constant ideological struggle against the West. In 1982, KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov underscored that intelligence work was not just information-gathering but also active measures “political struggle”marshallcenter.org. Throughout the Cold War, the Kremlin increasingly prioritized these covert influence operations as a complement to its military power. By the early 1980s, active measures were at the “heart of Soviet intelligence” and enjoyed substantial resources and attentionresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. A conservative CIA estimate in 1980 put the annual KGB budget for active measures at $3 billiondigitallibrary.tsu.ge.
Active measures somewhat declined in the late 1980s during Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform era (glasnost) and the post-Soviet 1990s, as Moscow pursued better relations with the West and coped with the collapse of the USSR’s intelligence networks abroadmarshallcenter.org. However, this retreat was temporary. Under President Vladimir Putin (from 2000 onward), Russia’s intelligence services regained funding and confidence, and the Kremlin’s worldview returned to seeing the West as a rival to be undermined. By the mid-2000s, active measures once again became a central pillar of Russian strategy, no longer confined to Russia’s immediate post-Soviet neighborhood, but expanded globallymarshallcenter.orgmarshallcenter.org. Modern Russian doctrine embraces a concept of “permanent war” in the information sphere, blurring the line between war and peace. As one Russian strategic expert wrote in 2007, “modern wars are waged on the level of consciousness and ideas”marshallcenter.org. In practice, this means the Kremlin sees itself as continuously engaged in political warfare – using active measures in peacetime to weaken opponents and prepare the ground for any future conflictresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. Today’s active measures, while updated with new tools like cyber tactics, are very much a continuation of this longstanding tradition of Russian political warfaremarshallcenter.orgmarshallcenter.org.
During the Cold War (approximately 1950s–1980s), the Soviet Union conducted numerous active measures operations around the world. These ranged from disinformation campaigns and forgeries to more direct influence efforts. Below we examine specific examples of Soviet active measures, including both successful and unsuccessful efforts:
Disinformation Campaigns: The KGB became infamous for spreading false narratives to tarnish the West. One of the most notorious operations was the AIDS conspiracy disinformation campaign in the 1980s, code-named Operation INFEKTION (also known as “Operation DENVER”). In this campaign, the KGB and its allies (like East Germany’s Stasi) planted and promoted the fake story that HIV/AIDS was a biological weapon created by the U.S. military at Fort Detrickwilsoncenter.org. Starting in 1985, Soviet outlets (e.g. the Novosti press agency) circulated the claim that the Pentagon had engineered HIV to target African Americans and others, a complete fabricationwilsoncenter.org. This active measure gained alarming traction: it was picked up by newspapers in over 50 countries and contributed to a persistent myth that the U.S. government “invented” AIDS, a myth that “cost countless lives” by undermining trust in factual public health informationtheguardian.com. U.S. investigations later confirmed the Soviet origin of the AIDS hoax and its wide impactwilsoncenter.org. Another example was Operation NEPTUNE (1964), a Czechoslovak intelligence disinformation operation that planted fake Nazi documents to smear West European politicians – illustrating the Soviet bloc’s penchant for forgery-based influence schemesdigitallibrary.tsu.ge.
Forgeries to Slander Opponents: Forging official documents to embarrass or discredit Western leaders was a common KGB tactic. In 1976, during the U.S. Democratic primaries, the KGB launched an active measure to derail the candidacy of Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (a strong anti-Soviet voice). They forged a supposedly confidential FBI memo (dated 1940) claiming Jackson was secretly gay and sent this fake document to major newspapers and even to Jimmy Carter’s campaignjustice.gov. The intent was to create a scandal and drive a wedge in the U.S. political process. This particular effort backfired: journalists and the Carter campaign recognized the letter as false, and it was never publishedjustice.gov. In 1984, Soviet intelligence tried a similar forgery against President Ronald Reagan. To smear Reagan as a McCarthy-era zealot, KGB agents circulated a forged 1947 letter ostensibly from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Reagan, thanking him for helping identify communists in Hollywoodjustice.gov. When the forgery surfaced in early 1984, the FBI swiftly denounced it as fake, noting obvious errors (Hoover’s supposed signature style and format did not match FBI practices)justice.gov. The goal had been to portray Reagan as an extremist and damage his re-election bid; ultimately, the U.S. press and public did not fall for it, and Reagan won a landslide victory, with the active measure having “failed” to achieve its objectivejustice.gov.
Stoking Social Unrest and Fissures: The KGB also deployed active measures to exacerbate divisions within Western societies. A declassified FBI report reveals that Soviet operatives funded “conspiracy-mongering” books and spread forged documents to blame the CIA for President John F. Kennedy’s assassinationjustice.gov. This was an attempt to erode Americans’ trust in their own institutions by feeding a popular conspiracy theory. Similarly, starting in the 1960s, the KGB embarked on “race-baiting” disinformation operations to inflame racial tensions in the United Statestheguardian.com. For example, in the lead-up to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, KGB Service A forged and mailed letters purporting to be from the Ku Klux Klan, threatening athletes from African and Asian countries with violence if they attended the Gamesnpr.org. This scheme aimed to depict the U.S. as irredeemably racist and unsafe. U.S. authorities later confirmed the Klan letters were a Soviet fabrication, not an authentic domestic threatcia.gov. While the letters did cause a brief scare and diplomatic embarrassment, their origin was exposed before they could deter participation in the Olympicsnpr.org. Throughout the Cold War, Moscow similarly tried to sow discord by exploiting societal divisions – for instance, circulating pamphlets alleging FBI plots against African American activists, or spreading rumors to aggravate anti-war sentiment in the Vietnam erajustice.gov.
Support to Proxy Groups and “Front” Organizations: Many Soviet active measures operated through ostensibly independent groups that were secretly backed by Moscow. The Communist Party fronts like the World Peace Council, the International Union of Students, and others were used to disseminate Soviet talking points under the guise of grassroots activism. Soviet intelligence channeled funds and propaganda to peace movements in Western Europe (especially during the 1980s anti-nuclear protests) to stoke public opposition to U.S. missile deploymentsjameslate.medium.com. While Western peace activists had genuine motives, the KGB saw an opportunity to “drive wedges” in NATO by amplifying fears of nuclear warresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. Likewise, the USSR covertly supported liberation movements and partisan groups in the Third World as active measures to counter Western influence. For instance, the KGB supplied arms and disinformation to certain militant factions in Latin America and the Middle East, framing them as indigenous struggles while steering them to serve Soviet geopolitical goalsdigitallibrary.tsu.ge. These efforts had mixed success: some boosted Moscow’s allies or tarnished Western reputations, but others were exposed or failed to change the target country’s policies in the long run.
In summary, Soviet active measures during the Cold War achieved notable successes in spreading false narratives (such as the enduring AIDS myth and various conspiracy theories) and in bolstering anti-Western currents around the world. At the same time, many operations were ultimately uncovered or countered by Western “truth squads” (like the U.S. Active Measures Working Group in the 1980s) and by a free press that debunked egregious forgeriesjustice.gov. U.S. and U.K. officials grew adept at exposing Soviet disinformation – yet the sheer volume and diversity of active measures meant some misinformation stuck and continued to influence public opinion for decades. The Cold War experience demonstrated the Kremlin’s willingness to “drive wedges in the western community” by any means availableresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk, foreshadowing the continuation of such tactics in the post-Soviet era.
In the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia was initially preoccupied with internal troubles and its global influence operations waned. But under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, the Russian Federation reactivated and reinvented active measures as a core element of statecraftmarshallcenter.org. Early hopes for cordial relations with the West faded, and by the mid-2000s Russia’s security apparatus once again embraced covert interference abroad as a “political weapon.” Modern active measures both revive Soviet-era methods (propaganda, subversion, proxy support) and add new tools like cyber warfare and Internet-driven disinformation. Here are key examples of Russian active measures from the 2000s onward:
Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns: Russia’s state agencies and media continue to spread strategic falsehoods. A case in point is the 2014 shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine. Almost immediately after the tragedy (which Western investigators later tied to a Russian-supplied missile), Russian officials and media launched a barrage of contradictory narratives – blaming Ukrainian forces, claiming it was a CIA plot, etc. – all to “confuse the narrative” and obscure Russia’s responsibilitymarshallcenter.org. This flood of disinformation successfully sowed doubt among some audiences, although the authoritative investigation by the Netherlands ultimately demonstrated Russian culpability. In 2018, when former Russian spy Sergei Skripal was poisoned with a nerve agent on U.K. soil, the Kremlin again responded with a disinformation offensive: state TV and diplomats offered dozens of alternate theories (Skripal overdosed, the British staged it, etc.). These efforts aimed to muddy the waters and cast Russia as the victim of “Russophobic” accusationsmarshallcenter.org. Another illustrative operation was the “Lisa case” in Germany (2016) – Russian media falsely reported that a 13-year-old Russian-German girl had been raped by migrants in Berlin. The story was entirely fabricated, but its wide coverage on Russian channels incited anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany and even prompted public protests, forcing the German government to refute the claims officiallymarshallcenter.org. Though debunked, the incident showed how Russian active measures in the information domain can quickly inflame social tensions in target countries.
Cyber-Enabled Active Measures: In the 21st century, the Kremlin has aggressively employed cyber operations as a means of conducting active measures remotely. The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia (following a dispute over a Soviet war memorial) were an early example, in which Estonian government and banking websites were bombarded, causing a nationwide online shutdown. Russian hackers – some possibly state-backed – signaled a new front of warfare. A more high-profile case was Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. elections. According to a bipartisan U.S. Senate investigation, President Putin personally ordered a campaign to hack into Democratic Party networks and email accounts, and to leak stolen information in order to damage Hillary Clinton’s candidacylawfaremedia.org. The Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) was implicated in the break-ins and in disseminating the hacked emails via proxies like WikiLeakslawfaremedia.org. Concurrently, a Kremlin-linked “troll farm” (the Internet Research Agency) ran a massive social media influence operation, masquerading as American activists to spread divisive content on Facebook and Twitternpr.orgnpr.org. This blend of cyber espionage and information warfare is a hallmark of modern active measures. U.S. intelligence concluded that Moscow’s interference sought to help Donald Trump’s prospects and undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process. Similarly, during the 2017 French presidential election, GRU hackers stole and leaked emails from candidate Emmanuel Macron’s campaign on the eve of the vote. In other cases, Russian cyber units have sabotaged infrastructure: for example, causing power grid blackouts in Ukraine (2015 and 2016) and engaging in disruptive hacks against Olympic organizations and international watchdog agencies. These incidents underscore that cyber attacks, once purely technical, are now routinely entwined with influence operations, as stolen data or chaos is leveraged for propaganda value.
Political Influence and Covert Operations Abroad: Modern Russia has extended active measures to include direct political subversion and even coup plots. A striking example was the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016. As Montenegro moved toward joining NATO, GRU officers allegedly masterminded a plot involving Serbian and local conspirators to storm the Parliament and assassinate the prime minister, hoping to install a pro-Russian government. The coup was foiled at the last moment, and later investigations traced the orchestration to Russian operatives – an active measure using paramilitary tactics to thwart NATO expansionmarshallcenter.org. Around the same time, Russian agents were active in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, seeking to influence elections and referendums. The SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) reportedly tried to disrupt the 2018 referendum in North Macedonia (on the country’s name change as part of an agreement to join NATO/EU) by backing nationalist protesters and spreading disinformationmarshallcenter.org. In Ukraine, since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Moscow has waged an intense hybrid war combining military action with relentless propaganda portraying the Kyiv government as “fascists” and justifying Russian intervention. Russian security services have also carried out targeted assassinations abroad (sometimes classified as active measures when politically motivated): for instance, the murder of Georgian exile Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin (2019) and attempts on other Kremlin critics, sending a chilling signal to dissidentsmarshallcenter.org.
Use of State Media and Diplomacy as Tools: The Kremlin’s active measures today often involve a whole-of-government approach. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and its diplomatic missions, while ostensibly engaging in normal diplomacy, have been caught amplifying and coordinating disinformation narratives. For example, Russian embassies’ social media accounts frequently push conspiracy theories or fake “evidence” that align with active measures goals (such as distorted accounts of the Syrian civil war or COVID-19 vaccine misinformation in some countries). Meanwhile, state-controlled media outlets RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik serve as global megaphones for the Kremlin’s messaging in multiple languages. These outlets mix real news with propaganda, giving Moscow deniability (as they claim editorial independence) while effectively spreading Kremlin-favored narratives. In the U.K., U.S., and EU, regulators have identified RT and similar outlets as instruments of Russian influence, with the U.S. requiring RT to register under a foreign agent law in 2017. In sum, contemporary Russian active measures are a fusion of old and new techniques: forgeries and front groups now co-exist with hackers and trolls, but the constant is the covert pursuit of strategic influence. Moscow’s campaigns target not only major Western powers but also countries in its near-abroad (e.g. the Baltics, Georgia, Ukraine), conflict zones (Syria), and even Africa and Latin America, where Russia seeks to undermine Western partnerships through propaganda and arms diplomacy.
Western governments have taken note of this resurgence. By the late 2010s, NATO and the EU were speaking openly of the “hybrid threat” posed by Russian disinformation and subversion. U.K. authorities noted that Russia under Putin is in some ways even more brazen than the Soviet era – often denying involvement in an operation, yet winking at it to intimidate others. As the U.K. Parliament’s analysis observed, Soviet active measures relied on plausible deniability, whereas today “deniability is no longer plausible” and the Kremlin may want the world to suspect its hand as a show of strengthresearchbriefings.files.parliament.ukresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. The modern landscape thus features a Russian state both covert and “implausibly” overt in its malign influence activities.
Russian active measures employ a versatile toolkit of tactics. These can be broadly categorized as follows:
Forgeries and Deceptive Documents: The fabrication of letters, reports or other documents to mislead target audiences has been a staple tactic. As seen in the Cold War (e.g., fake FBI memos about U.S. politiciansjustice.gov), forged documents are used to spread false accusations or “evidence” that can spark scandal. In the digital age, this now includes creating fake online personas or doctored digital files. A recent example was the alleged forgery of correspondence in the 2017 French campaign leaks to insert inflammatory claims. Document forgeries lend a veneer of authenticity to disinformation, making the lies more convincing if media or officials take the bait. However, savvy investigators often spot anomalies in style or technical details (for instance, the 1984 Hoover letter forgery contained idioms Hoover never usedjustice.gov, exposing it as fake). Despite the risk of exposure, forgeries can do damage if they circulate widely before being debunked.
Agents of Influence and Front Organizations: Rather than act directly, Moscow often works through intermediaries in the target country – recruited agents, sympathetic individuals, or organizations that can influence policy and public opinion on Russia’s behalf. These “agents of influence” can be journalists, academics, politicians, businesspeople, or even clergymarshallcenter.orgmarshallcenter.org. During the Cold War, the KGB cultivated such contacts (for example, subsidizing foreign journalists to plant stories, or secretly funding advocacy groups). In modern times, Russia has allegedly provided hidden support to political parties on both the far-left and far-right in Europe to undermine pro-NATO centrists. Front organizations – groups that appear independent but are covertly directed or funded by Moscow – remain a tool as well. A current illustration is the “Coordination Center for Russian Compatriots” in various countries, which organizes diaspora events but can also mobilize protests or lobbying in line with Kremlin objectives. The Russian Presidential Administration today even has a department dedicated to outreach that “seeks to suborn foreign politicians and movements” to Moscow’s causemarshallcenter.org. By using locals as mouthpieces, Russia adds credibility to its message and reduces attribution to itself.
Propaganda and Media Manipulation: Russian state-controlled media is arguably the most visible arm of active measures. Channels like RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik broadcast in multiple languages, framing news to favor the Kremlin’s narrativemarshallcenter.org. These outlets mix legitimate journalism with biased commentary and outright disinformation, allowing false stories to reach large international audiences under the guise of “news.” Russia also leverages social media heavily – creating thousands of fake accounts and bots to amplify certain messages or conspiracy theories. For example, during the U.S. NFL kneeling protests and the Black Lives Matter movement, Russian-linked Twitter accounts were found pushing both sides of the debate to intensify polarizationnpr.org. This tactic of “creating noise” in the information space makes it harder for the public to discern truth, and often magnifies extremist or fringe views. Moreover, by swiftly propagating content (memes, videos, articles) that aligns with existing grievances in a society, Russian info-ops can organically blend into domestic debates. Traditional diplomatic channels are used for propaganda as well: official social media of Russian embassies often share conspiracy-laden content (for instance, the Russian Embassy in London tweeting alternative theories about the Skripal poisoning). Media manipulation extends to selectively releasing or doctoring information – such as editing leaked phone calls or mis-translating statements – to embarrass adversaries. An example occurred in early 2014: an intercepted call between U.S. diplomats about Ukraine was leaked (with the infamous “explicative- the EU” remark), and Russian media gave it extensive coverage to drive a wedge between Western alliesmarshallcenter.org. In summary, control of media narratives – through both overt state media and covert online personas – is a powerful weapon in the active measures arsenal, allowing Moscow to shape perceptions worldwide.
Cyber Operations and Hacking: Russia’s integration of cyber warfare into active measures is a defining feature of the modern era. Hacking provides access to sensitive information that can be weaponized. For instance, the GRU’s hack of U.S. Democratic Party emails in 2016 yielded content that was strategically leaked to influence the news cycle and candidates’ imagesmarshallcenter.org. Cyber intrusions can also enable sabotage (as with malware attacks on infrastructure) or espionage (stealing data for blackmail or strategic advantage). But from an active measures perspective, even pure cyber attacks serve a psychological goal: demonstrating Russia’s reach and sowing fear. The 2017 “NotPetya” malware attack, attributed to Russia, devastated computer systems in Ukraine and inadvertently affected global companies – this kind of attack blurs the line between cyberwar and economic disruption, arguably to punish and destabilize Ukraine. Additionally, cyber operations facilitate “false flag” deceptions – Russian hackers have impersonated Islamist hackers or others to misattribute their attacks. The online realm also allows rapid narrative laundering: false stories can originate on obscure forums or Kremlin-backed websites and then be amplified by bots into mainstream discussion (a tactic described as the “firehose” of falsehood). In essence, cyber tools have supercharged Russia’s ability to conduct active measures at scale and across great distances, with a degree of anonymity.
Political Warfare and Economic Influence: Beyond the above, Russia employs financial and economic leverage as part of active measures. This can include illicit campaign financing (offering funding to favored politicians – as the KGB attempted with a U.S. candidate in 1968justice.gov, or more recently alleged Russian bank loans to European parties), blackmail (kompromat) using compromising material, and economic pressure such as energy supply manipulation to influence nations’ policies. While these are not “active measures” in the narrowest sense (they can be more direct statecraft or espionage), they are often intertwined with disinformation. For example, when Russian banks fund a foreign politician, disinformation might be deployed concurrently to boost that politician’s platform. Or conversely, when a politician takes a hard line against Moscow, Russia might retaliate with a blend of trade sanctions (e.g. banning imports) and an info-campaign against them. In the active measures playbook, there is no clear boundary between informational and other forms of covert action – the Kremlin will use any mix of tools (diplomatic, economic, military, cyber, propaganda) to achieve its ends, a strategy often termed “hybrid warfare”voanews.com.
The common thread across these tactics is deniability and deception. Active measures typically involve concealing the Russian hand behind events, or at least creating ambiguity. Whether it’s a fake news story, a proxy protest, or a hacker persona, the aim is to manipulate the target while avoiding a direct state-to-state confrontation. This allows Russia to exert influence while officially denying wrongdoing (or dismissing allegations as “Western paranoia”). However, as noted, in some cases Russia now engages in implausible deniability – the mask slips, but Russia may cynically shrug it off, calculating that the benefits of intimidation outweigh the costs of being caughtresearchbriefings.files.parliament.ukresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk.
How effective are active measures, and what threat do they pose today? U.S. and U.K. government assessments, as well as academic and think-tank analyses, indicate that Russian active measures remain a serious concern for global security and democracy. Key observations include:
Persistent and Growing Threat: Officials characterize Russian disinformation and covert influence as an ongoing, strategic threat to Western democracies. A June 2018 joint statement by G7 nations (echoed by the U.K. Foreign Office) warned that “foreign interference in our democratic institutions and processes, and other forms of malign state activity, pose a strategic threat to our shared values and interests.” It emphasized the need for a unified response to “send a clear message that such malign activity will never be tolerated”, and announced new mechanisms to tackle this “growing threat.”researchbriefings.files.parliament.ukresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. Likewise, in the United States, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and law enforcement agencies have repeatedly flagged Russian influence operations as a top-tier national security issue. In 2020, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee’s final report on Russian election interference concluded that Russia’s active measures in 2016 constituted a “grave” counterintelligence threat to the U.S., given the success in accessing campaign data and the willingness of some Americans to interact with Russian operativeslawfaremedia.orglawfaremedia.org. FBI and Homeland Security officials have since warned that Russia continued similar efforts in the 2018 and 2020 elections, albeit with varied techniques.
Impact on Public Discourse and Trust: The effectiveness of active measures can be measured not just in tangible outcomes (like who wins an election) but in the more insidious erosion of trust. U.S. analysts note that even if Russian interference doesn’t always change votes, it can “cause harm and additional resentment” in societynpr.org. For example, the Russian social media campaigns amplified polarizing issues (race relations, immigration, vaccination debates), aggravating social divides. This corrosive effect undermines the public’s ability to agree on basic facts, a cornerstone of democratic discourse. In Europe, Russian disinformation has at times influenced public opinion – for instance, helping fuel skepticism about EU policies or COVID-19 vaccines in some communities – though quantifying its effect is difficult. Importantly, the sheer belief that Russia is meddling everywhere can itself be destabilizing. As Professor Mark Galeotti observes, the climate of suspicion means outsiders “see the Kremlin’s hand behind every” political crisis or protest, which “has an undeniably baleful impact on international relations” by breeding paranoiamarshallcenter.org. This ironically credits Putin with more influence than he may actually have, potentially emboldening the Kremlin. Galeotti wryly calls this dynamic “perhaps the greatest active measure of all”marshallcenter.org – in other words, making your adversaries mistrust one another and even mistrust their own institutions is itself a victory.
Successes vs. Failures: Modern Russian active measures have had mixed success. On one hand, operations like the 2016 U.S. election interference achieved some of Moscow’s short-term aims: they stole and leaked high-profile information, injected pro-Russia narratives into political discourse, and caught U.S. security services off-guard. A U.S. Department of Justice review in 2020 noted that these actions “didn’t begin in 2016” but built on a long history, and that the United States must strengthen its defenses accordinglyjustice.govjustice.gov. On the other hand, exposure of Russian operations has led to pushback and consequences. Western countries have imposed sanctions, expelled diplomats (as in the coordinated response to the Skripal poisoning in 2018), and taken legal action against spies and cyber operators. For instance, Mueller’s investigation indicted Russian individuals and the IRA troll farm for election meddling, and U.S. courts charged GRU officers for hacking offenses. In the U.K., the 2020 Intelligence and Security Committee “Russia Report” criticized the government for not investigating Kremlin interference enough, but it affirmed that Russia did try to influence the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and likely Brexit as well, even if the impact was “unquantifiable.” The U.K. has since boosted its National Cyber Security Centre and police efforts to counter hostile state disinformation. The effectiveness of active measures is thus a cat-and-mouse game: Russia adapts its tactics (for example, using more subtle methods or third-party proxies) as Western defenses improve. However, open societies remain vulnerable to manipulation of information – a fact that Russia exploits.
Current Trajectory: As of 2025, analysts see Russian active measures as continuing unabated and even expanding into new arenas. A 2025 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on Russia’s “shadow war” notes an uptick in Russian sabotage and subversion operations in Europe, indicating that Moscow has not been deterred by past exposurecsis.orgcsis.org. The war in Ukraine (2022–present) has been accompanied by intense Russian propaganda globally – from false justifications of the invasion (“denazification” claims) to influence campaigns aimed at African and Asian audiences to blame food shortages on Western sanctions rather than Russian aggression. The audacity of some operations, like offering bounties to Taliban fighters to target NATO troops (reported by U.S. intelligence in 2020), or hacking the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague in 2018, shows that the Kremlin is willing to take significant risks. Western governments assess that Russia considers these measures low-cost and high-impact. As long as Putin’s regime perceives itself in a confrontation with the West, it will likely continue deploying active measures as a form of asymmetric warfare – seeking to exploit the open media environment of democracies while shielding itself with denials.
In conclusion, active measures remain a key facet of Russian strategy. Their effectiveness varies by case – some operations flop or get exposed quickly, while others have a lingering influence – but collectively, they pose a sustained challenge to the integrity of information and political processes worldwide. U.S. and U.K. security agencies consistently rank Russian disinformation campaigns and cyber-enabled influence ops as a top-tier threat. As a result, there are growing calls in the West to bolster societal resilience against fake news, reinvigorate interagency counter-disinformation working groups (reviving the spirit of the Cold War Active Measures Working Groupndupress.ndu.edu), and improve public awareness of how foreign influence manifests. The current threat level is viewed as high: Moscow’s active measures are ongoing, adaptable, and global in reach, meaning democracies must stay vigilant. Yet, as experts remind us, not every disturbance is a Kremlin plot – navigating between undue alarm and complacency is part of meeting the active measures challenge.
Below is a table summarizing major Soviet and Russian active measures operations across different eras, highlighting their dates, primary targets, and outcomes:
| Date | Operation & Description | Target(s) | Outcome/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1976 | Forged FBI Letter Smearing U.S. Senator – KGB created a fake FBI memo accusing Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of homosexualityjustice.gov and sent it to media and rivals during Democratic primaries. | U.S. election (Democratic primary); Sen. Jackson’s reputation. | Failed. The forgery was recognized as false and never published, having no effect on the electionjustice.gov. |
| 1984 | “Ku Klux Klan” Olympic Threat Letters – KGB Service A forged letters in the name of the KKK, threatening African and Asian nations’ athletes with violence at the Los Angeles Olympicsnpr.org. | Olympic teams from Africa & Asia; U.S. international image. | Failed (Exposed). Some alarm was caused initially, but the U.S. exposed the letters as Soviet forgeries; the ploy did not prevent teams from attendingnpr.org. |
| 1985–86 | AIDS Disinformation (Operation INFEKTION) – KGB spread propaganda via press and agents that HIV/AIDS was a U.S. bioweapon engineered at Fort Detrickwilsoncenter.org (with Stasi assistance). | Global public opinion (especially in developing countries); U.S. credibility. | Partially Successful. The false AIDS origin story gained wide circulation and was believed by many, damaging U.S. credibility. The myth persisted for decades, though it was later debunked and attributed to Soviet active measureswilsoncenter.orgtheguardian.com. |
| July 2014 | MH17 Shootdown Disinformation – After Malaysian Air Flight 17 was downed over Ukraine, Russian media and officials pushed multiple conflicting theories (e.g., blaming a Ukrainian fighter jet, claiming a NATO plot) to deflect blamemarshallcenter.org. | International public and investigators of MH17 incident. | Partially Successful. Russia’s campaign sowed confusion and delayed consensus. However, the Joint Investigation Team ultimately attributed the attack to a Russian-made missile from separatists, and many countries held Russia responsible. The disinformation clouded the information space but did not prevent official attributionmarshallcenter.org. |
| 2016 | U.S. Election Interference (Hack & Leak) – Russian GRU hackers breached Democratic Party emails and leaked them (via WikiLeaks) to hurt Hillary Clinton’s campaignlawfaremedia.org. Concurrently, the Internet Research Agency ran a troll campaign on social media to polarize voters. | U.S. electorate; 2016 U.S. presidential election process. | Successful Disruption. Emails were leaked at key moments, influencing news cycles and sparking discord. U.S. intelligence concluded Putin ordered this operationlawfaremedia.org. While its effect on the election result is debated, it prompted investigations and sanctions, and is considered a “grave” security threat by the Senatelawfaremedia.org. |
| Oct 2016 | “Lisa Case” Fake Abduction Story – Russian state TV and social media spread a false story that a 13-year-old Russian-German girl in Berlin was abducted and raped by migrantsmarshallcenter.org. The tale was used to stoke anti-immigrant sentiment. | German public and government; Europe’s refugee policy debate. | Initially Effective, Then Debunked. The story inflamed tensions in Germany and prompted protests from the Russian-German community. German police investigations proved the story was fabricated, and officials accused Russia of propaganda interference. The incident strained Russia-Germany relations, though the myth was short-lived once disprovenmarshallcenter.org. |
| Oct 2016 | Montenegro Coup Attempt – GRU officers allegedly directed a plot to violently overthrow Montenegro’s government to block NATO accessionmarshallcenter.org. Conspirators planned to attack the parliament on election day. | Montenegro’s pro-Western government; NATO expansion in Balkans. | Failed (Foiled). Montenegrin authorities, with intel help, arrested plotters on election day. Courts later convicted several in absentia (including two Russians). The coup attempt was thwarted, and Montenegro joined NATO in 2017 despite Russia’s effortmarshallcenter.org. |
Table: Selected Soviet & Russian active measures operations, illustrating their dates, targets, and outcomes. Each example reflects the varied tactics and objectives – from spreading false narratives to orchestrating coups – that fall under “active measures.” Some operations achieved Kremlin goals (e.g., spreading a lasting myth), others backfired or were exposed, but all are instructive of the continuous thread of political warfare employed by Moscow.
The concept of active measures encapsulates a long-running doctrine of political warfare practiced by Moscow – first under the Soviet KGB and now under Putin’s security state. Through a mix of cunning deception, opportunistic alliances, and modern technology, Russia has shown itself adept at meddling in the affairs of other nations without crossing into open conflict. U.S. and U.K. intelligence histories make clear that these activities have evolved but not abated. From Cold War forgeries and front groups to today’s hacking and trolling, active measures remain a favored tool to “weaken the West” and project Russian influenceresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk.
Crucially, the effectiveness of active measures lies in exploiting the vulnerabilities of open societies – be it free media, social divisions, or political polarization. By injecting false or disruptive inputs, the Kremlin hopes to induce reactions that benefit its strategic position. While Western nations have become more aware of this playbook, the challenge is ongoing: as new channels of information emerge (social media, messaging apps), the techniques for subversion also adapt.
Government reports from Washington and London concur that vigilance and transparency are key. Exposing disinformation quickly, educating citizens to spot fake narratives, and reinforcing democratic institutions against covert influence are seen as the best defenses. In the 1980s, the U.S. Active Measures Working Group proved that sunlight could disinfect many Soviet lies by publicly revealing themlawfaremedia.org. Today, a similar resolve is needed on a larger scale, given the speed and reach of digital propaganda.
In summary, ‘active measures’ is a concept that has stood the test of time in the Kremlin’s arsenal. It has reshaped conversations, fueled conspiracies, and at times altered the course of nations – all while operating in the shadows. Understanding its history and methods is not merely an academic exercise, but a practical necessity for contemporary policy-makers and citizens alike. As long as Russia views itself in an adversarial stance with the West, it will continue to wage this form of covert influence campaign. Thus, appreciating the scope of active measures – from the Cold War to the cyber age – is essential to mitigating their impact and safeguarding democratic societies in the years ahead.
Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, FBI and CIA historical records; U.K. Parliamentary research briefings; academic studies in International Affairs; think-tank reports (Marshall Center, Wilson Center, CSIS); and other declassified documents and analyses as cited throughout.researchbriefings.files.parliament.ukmarshallcenter.orgmarshallcenter.orglawfaremedia.org